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I. Introduction
The economics literature typically describes R&D and investment in innovation as
activities that create new knowledge. But some innovative activity is directed, instead, toward
facilitating the communication of technical knowledge, sometimes to significant effect.
For example, as part of writing a general chemistry textbook during the 1860s, Mendeleev
developed a periodic table to summarize experimentally-derived knowledge about chemical
properties. This table facilitated the education of new chemists. Chemistry students no longer
needed to study and absorb thousands of seemingly unrelated experiments. Instead, they could
readily infer chemical properties from the highly formalized representation in the periodic table.
Along with new laboratory techniques for the analysis and synthesis of chemicals, this table
changed the chemical industry, fostering some of the first industrial R&D laboratories, making
innovation more geographically dispersed, and making firms less reliant on trade secrecy
and more reliant on patents (Haber 1958, Moser 2008, 2009). This new representation of
chemical knowledge changed the chemical industry because it changed the cost of
communicating technical knowledge.
Other examples of such scientific abstraction include Newton’s Laws and Maxwell’s
equations. In addition, other sorts of activities also “formalize” technical knowledge, thereby
reducing communication costs. Observational or tacit knowledge is codified so that it can be
referenced more easily—much technical industry literature consists of this sort of information.
Also, technical standards and “dominant designs” such as the Wintel standard reduce the
complexity of knowledge, facilitating its spread. Finally, knowledge can be embodied in
hardware or software so that it can be automatically applied. In each of these instances, an
investment in formalization serves to reduce the marginal cost of communicating technical
knowledge. Casual observation suggests that such formalizing activities account for a good deal
of industrial innovative investment.
The communication of technical knowledge is essential for the application of that
knowledge in production, for the improvement of that knowledge and for the development of
2new knowledge. As such, the knowledge involved is often complex and not necessarily well-
articulated. Broadly conceived, the cost of communicating this technical knowledge can include
the cost of extensive interaction between teacher and student and extensive experimentation to
verify the student’s acquisition of the knowledge, possibly even re-creating it. Because technical
knowledge is often not highly formalized, these communication costs can be much greater than
the mere cost of transmitting information.
Moreover, the activity of formalizing knowledge suggests that communication costs are
endogenous, that is, economic actors choose to invest in formalization depending on economic
conditions. In contrast, the assumption in most of the literature is that communication costs are
exogenously fixed. While the communication costs of human capital are typically assumed to be
high, the communication costs of inventions and technical knowledge are usually assumed to be
low. For example, low communication costs underpin Arrows’s (1962) finding that innovations
tend to be undersupplied in competitive markets because of insufficient appropriability and
Romer’s argument (1990) that innovations give rise to increasing returns to scale. Yet
endogenous communication costs raise the possibility that these findings might be contingent on
the market or technology and possibly subject to change over time.
The contribution of this paper is to explore a simple model where communication costs are
endogenous. I revisit and generalize Arrow’s 1962 model of innovation, which assumes zero
communication costs. To this model I add a convex communication cost function, I allow fixed
investments in formalization to reduce the marginal cost of communication, and I generalize the
competition between firms using old and new technologies.
I find that the decision to formalize knowledge is associated with a variety of economic
conditions, suggesting rich patterns of behavior beyond the standard models. The intuition that
drives these results is simple: it does not pay to formalize knowledge unless the market is
sufficiently large to recoup formalization costs. Conversely, producing a large output is typically
too costly unless the technical knowledge has been formalized. This means that the decision to
formalize is made jointly with decisions about output and pricing.
3In particular, unformalized knowledge will tend to be associated with markets where the
new technology coexists with the old. This is because when a new technology is not substantially
better than the old—for example, during the early stages of a technology—then firms will not
formalize the new knowledge and communication costs will act as a capacity constraint on the
scale of the new technology. Then the new technology cannot feasibly replace all of the old, that
is, innovation is not drastic. Of course, new and old technologies often coexist for sustained
periods.1
This is important because I show that coexistence affects the behavior of new technology
firms. In particular, if the old technology market is sufficiently competitive, then competition
between the new technology firms is “soft.” New technology firms act strategically tough toward
incumbent firms, but softly toward each other. For example, the entry of other new technology
firms does not dissipate their rents, patents do not increase ex ante rents, and firms may be
willing to freely exchange knowledge with each other in some circumstances. On the other hand,
when innovation is drastic, competition between new technology firms is “hard,” patents are
needed to realize maximum rents and knowledge exchange occurs only under license or sale.
Thus behavior regarding technical knowledge can change dramatically depending on
whether the market is in a “coexistence” equilibrium or a “drastic” equilibrium and this will vary
systematically with characteristics of the market. This is important because many technologies
improve gradually over time (e.g., see Rosenberg 1979). Often new technologies are initially
inferior to the old technology but eventually become substantially better. When this happens (and
assuming that the old technology is competitive), the manner in which technical knowledge is
acquired, protected, used to compete, exchanged, and diffused varies systematically with the
maturity of the technology. That is, some technologies follow a sort of life cycle of technical
knowledge. In the early stage (or in coexistence equilibria more generally), knowledge is
communicated via costly personal instruction, making geographic localization, social networks,
employee mobility and migration important and competition between new technology firms soft.
1. Observers sometimes attribute this to product differentiation (e.g., Christensen 1997).
Here, the technologies can coexist even when they are perfect substitutes.
4In later stages (or in drastic equilibria generally), knowledge is formalized, teaching relies more
on formal instruction, markets can more readily emerge for general human capital and the
interactions between new technology firms are more strategic. This life cycle for technical
knowledge is not necessarily identical to some of the technology life cycles discussed in the
literature, which often focus on firm entry rates rather than on the use of knowledge.
Nevertheless, evidence I discuss below suggests that coexistence equilibria might be common
during the early stages of many technologies and possibly in other circumstances as well.
Thus endogenous communication costs give rise to rich patterns of behavior that vary
systematically with technological maturity and other market characteristics. This means that the
conventional wisdom about patents and knowledge sharing might apply in some circumstances
(e.g., drastic equilibria), but not others; to some phases of technology (mature), but not all. This
has important implications for several policy areas including patents, trade secrecy and employee
mobility.
Endogenous communication costs might also explain several apparent paradoxes:
• why pioneer inventors in some technologies such as software often do not patent and
often share knowledge, while large companies do most of the patenting in these
technologies, even though large companies presumably have substantial complementary
assets and thus might not need patents;
• why new communication and transportation technologies facilitate the global spread of
technical knowledge needed for producing mature products, but early stage innovation
often remains highly localized in places like Silicon Valley;
• and why developing nations that have grown by mastering mature technologies often
experience a “middle income trap,” facing difficulty moving to the technology frontier.
Literature review
While the literature has touched on aspects of the costs of communicating technical
knowledge, it has not identified the connection between formalization and market competition
and the rich implications that follow. A large literature, of course, discusses information
economics, but most of this concerns small quantities of information, such as an agent’s private
5valuation. As such, this sort of information is not costly to communicate. In contrast, technical
knowledge can require much greater “bandwidth” and, for this reason, can be costly to
communicate.
Some scholars have observed that inventors can change the marginal cost of
communicating technical knowledge, for instance, by codifying it (Nelson and Winter 1982,
Cowan et al. 1997,1999, Foray 2004). This paper goes further, making the connection to market
competition and drawing out implications that communication costs have for a variety of
economic behavior.
Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990, 1994) argue that an important part of R&D spending is
directed to building “absorptive capacity,” the knowledge needed to interpret external knowledge
and apply it to the firm’s own technology.2 Absorptive capacity is closely related to
communication cost. To the extent that external knowledge is intentionally transferred, this
spending is part of the communication cost. More generally, cumulative investments in
absorptive capacity provide background knowledge that facilitates the communication of new
knowledge.
Economic models often assume fixed communication costs or fixed costs of imitation
(unintended communication). My analysis complements these models, providing an endogenous
interaction that leads to richer patterns of behavior. For example, Arrow’s 1962 paper provides
the starting point for both the normative theory of invention incentives (see Gallini and
Scotchmer 2001 for a review) and for much of the descriptive theory of the role of innovation in
industrial organization. Scholars, including Arrow (see 1969) have, of course, recognized that
Arrow’s assumption of negligible communication costs is not general and, for that reason,
patents are not always “needed.” However, my analysis suggests that the critical early phases of
technologies will systematically tend to have substantial communication costs. The model in this
2. Cohen and Levinthal discuss external knowledge from the public domain but they do
not distinguish whether that knowledge was willingly shared or not nor do they explicitly
consider external knowledge transactions between firms. Their analysis, in fact, applies broadly
to all forms of external knowledge.
6paper extends the standard analysis to provide some consideration of innovation policy, both
patent and otherwise, for this critical phase. Moreover, communication costs are significant not
only because they provide a degree of appropriability, but they can also change the nature of
innovative competition so that inventors might even share knowledge.
Indeed, economists have noted that inventors sometimes freely exchange knowledge,
describing this as “extremely puzzling” (Allen 1983), “novel” (von Hippel 1987), and “startling”
(Lerner and Tirole 2002; see also Harhoff et al. 2003, Henkel 2006, Schrader 1991 and Stein
2008). But knowledge sharing is only puzzling if one assumes that communication costs are
negligible and that knowledge licensing is Pareto efficient. I show that when these conditions do
not hold—as they might not during the early phase of a technology—then free knowledge
exchange emerges naturally.
A related issue concerns the difference between academic science and industrial research.
Dasgupta and David (1994) highlight the different norms and incentives of these two systems.
Aghion et al. (2008) see the two sectors providing different tradeoffs between creative control
and research focus. My model complements these, suggesting that even within industry, research
on early stage technologies might exhibit academic-like behavior, with sharing of knowledge and
little reliance on patents. On the other hand, the formalization of knowledge required to publish
scientific findings plays an entirely different role than formalization in industry.
My model generates patterns similar to those described in the product life cycle literature.
Vernon (1966) hypothesizes that international production takes place only after knowledge to
produce and market a new product is sufficiently standardized. This is an example of
formalization as is the “dominant design” of Utterback and Abernathy (1975, Utterback 1996).
In other models, the patterns are similar but the causal mechanisms might be different such as
with Christensen’s “disruptive innovation” (1997) and Meyer’s (2007) model of open source
innovation that transitions into proprietary manufacturing. Generally, very little of the product
life cycle literature pays much specific attention to the changing nature of the transmission of
knowledge. In some formal models, such as those by Winter (1984), Klepper and Graddy (1990)
and Klepper (1996), imitation figures prominently, but the ease of imitation is exogenously
7fixed. In contrast to all of these models, my model considers how the transmission of technical
knowledge—both intended and imitative—might change with technological maturity. Because of
this, my model provides empirical predictions that go beyond those of the product life cycle
literature, affecting such features as geographic localization, patent propensity and human capital
acquisition.
Eric von Hippel (1994, 2005) has highlighted the importance of communication costs for
the nature of innovation. He shows that when technical knowledge is “sticky” (that is, difficult to
communicate), users of the technology tend to do the innovation themselves rather than
manufacturers. This finding is closely related to my result that production tends to be small scale
when communication costs are high.
Foray and Steinmueller (2003, Foray 2004) point out that codification of knowledge has an
added benefit: new representations of knowledge sometimes facilitate the generation of new
knowledge. For example, the periodic table not only reduced learning costs, but it also correctly
predicted the existence of several new elements. In a similar vein, Mokyr (2002) ascribes a
critical role to the generalization of practical knowledge during the Industrial Revolution. He
argues that new “epistemic” knowledge created from such generalizations helped sustain
innovation. In my model, new knowledge arises from the exchange of knowledge, but I do not
consider the facilitating role formalization might have. While this latter role might be important,
the mechanism that I highlight itself might also be critical to sustaining innovation, especially for
early stage technologies when practical knowledge is not yet highly formalized.
Finally, the model here is related to one in Bessen and Maskin (2009). Innovative activity
here is complementary and sequential, similar to that model. The early phase of the model here
corresponds to the conditions in that model that give rise to a particularly dynamic mode of
innovation, so this model can be seen as providing an explanation for why those conditions
might arise in practice.
Ideas or knowledge?
The analysis in this paper concerns the communication of technical knowledge,
meaning the detailed knowledge to design, build, install, operate and consume a technology and
8its products. In contrast much of the literature on innovation and economic growth focuses
instead on “ideas,” which are sharply distinguished from human capital (see Romer 1990 or
Jones 2005). Ideas, it is held, are inherently non-rivalrous and not excludable except to the extent
that patents limit use. An idea can be replicated at zero cost, giving rise to increasing returns in
production (Romer 1990). However, because intellectual property protection is imperfect, an
idea can “spillover” to competitors, creating a free-riding externality. Because of this, private
rents are less than the social value of the idea, so ideas will tend to be under-supplied in a
competitive market (Arrow 1962).
As is well recognized, this analysis, however useful, abstracts away from some important
practical realities such as communication costs. In this idealized depiction, ideas have zero
communication costs. But in reality, what matters for production is knowledge, not individual
ideas. For example, the source code of a software program that instructs a computer how to add
is a nonrival “idea” that can be copied at low cost. But to actually perform addition with such a
program requires the knowledge of how to compile that code in its given language, to install the
executable, to operate the computer, etc. The technical knowledge needed to produce something
typically consists of very many ideas, not just a single idea. Moreover, some of these ideas might
not codified or articulated; some might require a specific language or other background
knowledge in order to interpret them (“absorptive capacity”); and users might need to understand
not only the separate ideas, but also how they interact. In general, production that involves
humans requires a combination of human capital and ideas. Moreover, because the ideas cannot
be used without additional human knowledge, this knowledge is typically a perfect complement
to the ideas. That is, ideas are economically worthless without the necessary associated
knowledge. As Boldrin and Levine note (2008, Chapter 7), economic value resides in the usable
copy of the idea, not in the abstract idea itself.
Of course, where that knowledge is readily available at low cost, then the abstract model
of ideas is a useful approximation to reality. For instance, this might be true where technical
knowledge is highly formalized and supplied in competitive markets as general human capital.
However, such circumstances are not general and the difference is important for several reasons.
9First, although ideas might be copied at low cost, this does not mean that knowledge has
low excludability without patents. If prospective users can be excluded from using the
knowledge needed to put an idea into production, then they can be excluded from using the ideas
as well. To cite an extreme example, alchemists, including Isaac Newton, often wrote their ideas
in secret codes. While their manuscripts could be copied at low cost, the use of this knowledge
was limited to those exclusive few who knew the code. Everyone else had high imitation costs.
Below I argue that communication costs are related to the costs of imitation and hence to
excludability. Because of this, unformalized knowledge can have sufficient appropriability even
without patents. Then, instead of knowledge “leaking out” in the form of spillovers, knowledge
is exchanged—it is licensed or sold; or it is freely exchanged; or exchange happens indirectly
through employee mobility.3 When this is true, inventors might consider the benefit of their
knowledge to other parties when making investment decisions, thereby internalizing knowledge
externalities.
The distinction between knowledge and ideas is also important for the nature of
competition. When firms have accumulated different background knowledge, they have different
“absorptive capacities” to use a new technology (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, 1994). Firms that
have not accumulated the necessary background knowledge of a new technology cannot readily
use it. This means that different groups of firms use different technologies so that competition is
between technologies (as in the standards and network effects literatures) as well as between
firms using a particular technology. In this case, an individual innovation is relevant only to
firms using a particular technology, a richer environment than that depicted in, say, the patent
race literature. Where an earlier literature looked at the persistence of monopoly with regard to
an individual innovation, here I obtain results about how monopoly or competition in an
incumbent technology affects competition among firms using a new technology.
3. Unfortunately, the term “spillover” is sometimes used to include any kind of information sharing, not just
unintended leakage of knowledge. I use the more limited sense here.
10II. The Cost of Communicating Technical Knowledge
Technical knowledge
Consider the information or knowledge needed to build and use a technology. For the
moment, ignore the distinction between knowledge and information. Let a technique, be a vector
of n technical parameters, . Without loss of generality, the parameters can be
binary, . Let S be a vector representing the m monitored states of nature, also binary,
.
A technology, T, maps each monitored state of nature to a technique, . A
technology can thus be represented by bits of data. This is the information measure of the
technology, .
Cost of person-to-person teaching
Now, suppose that a single teacher wants to communicate technical knowledge
to L students. I wish to assume generally that the cost of communication in this case is: 1.)
proportional to the amount of information being communicated, I(T), and is 2.) convex in the
number of students.
To motivate this assumption, it is helpful to compare teaching to Claude Shannon’s model
of a noisy communication channel.4 The teacher initially broadcasts the information to her
students and the duration (cost) of this broadcast will be equal to the amount of information
divided by the communication rate. However, for a variety of reasons, the initial broadcast is
received with errors. Errors might arise from the students’ limited attention or cognition, or the
imprecision of the teacher’s language, or the difficulty of articulating the information. Students
might lack the knowledge to assimilate and understand the information they receive, that is, they
might lack sufficient “absorptive capacity” (Cohen and Levinthal 1989).
To correct these errors, each student’s knowledge must be tested and the teacher will then
re-transmit some portion of the information relevant to the detected errors. This process might
then be repeated. Because this error correction cycle is unique to each student, the total time
4. Arrow (1969) suggests this analogy.
11required for error correction increases with the number of students. Given limited resources for
the teacher’s time, for the classroom, equipment, etc., this means that each student generates a
congestion externality.5 Because of this, the average time (cost) of training a student increases
with the number of students in the class, L. This assumption corresponds, of course, to the well-
established empirical finding for school education that the effectiveness of education diminishes
with class size. Of course, some economies of scale or network effects might work to reduce
average costs with class size, but I assume that the combined effect is still one of increasing
average cost.
This assumption can be written formally as
Assumption 1. Costs of teaching. The total cost of communicating the knowledge of
technology T to L students is
.
The subscript “u” designates unformalized knowledge, in contrast to communicating
formalized knowledge, designated with an “f”.6
Formalized knowledge
It is possible to reduce the information measure of a technology through the use of
formalized knowledge. For an example, consider typesetting systems where the typographer
needs to know how to hyphenate words. In the most primitive form of knowledge, the
typographer would need to learn the hyphenation points of all the words he is likely to encounter.
This is a large instructional burden, but formalization of the knowledge of various sorts can
reduce the learning cost:
5. In the simplest case, students sharing the same classroom must wait while the teacher corrects the
knowledge of other students.
6. Note that this formulation assumes a single quality of knowledge. In a more realistic model, the student
might have more or fewer errors and hence more or less accurate knowledge, and additional teaching cost could
communicate knowledge more accurately.
121. Codification. Knowledge can be “expressed in a particular language and recorded on a
particular medium” (Foray 2004, p. 74). This allows the knowledge to be communicated
with less personal interaction. For example, the knowledge of hyphenation points can be
codified by putting them in a dictionary. Then, in practical terms, the typographer need
only learn the hyphenation points of the most frequently encountered words; the
remaining words can be looked up in the dictionary as needed. This reduces the
information measure of the technology from I(T) to I(T*).
2. Standardization. By limiting the range of inputs, outputs and operating conditions, the
number of states that need to be monitored can be decreased, thus decreasing the
information measure of the technology as well. In the typesetting example,
standardization on a single language reduces the information measure of the technology.
3. Modularization. By breaking the knowledge into semi-independent modules and using a
division of labor, the amount of knowledge each worker learns is less. Examples of
modularization include “innovation toolkits” (von Hippel and Katz 2002) and
Application Programming Interfaces in software.
4. Abstraction. It is possible to derive general rules for hyphenating, for example, many
words that end in “ing” can be hyphenated before that suffix. The typographer could be
taught that rule (plus exceptions), thus further reducing the information measure. This
can be called algorithmic knowledge, e.g., Donald Knuth developed a hyphenation
algorithm. Abstraction is also a feature of scientific knowledge: science reduces
observational data (e.g., hundreds of years of astronomical observation) to some simple
relationships (e.g., Newton’s laws of motion) that can be used to reproduce the
observational data. This sort of abstraction also reduces the information needed to
employ technologies. For example, the periodic table and associated techniques allowed
complex craft methods of producing dyes to be replaced by chemical synthesis of a few
well-controlled steps.
5. Embodiment/automation. The cost of communicating technical knowledge can also be
reduced by embodying that knowledge in a physical form that acts on that knowledge.7
13For example, with computers, the hyphenation dictionary (or the algorithm) can be
embodied in a computer program so that the typographer need not learn hyphenation.
This also reduces the information measure of the knowledge needed to use typesetting
technology. Of course, a wide variety of mechanical and electrical devices serve to
embody technical knowledge as well as computer programs. When this embodied
knowledge is used to allow a machine to perform work previously performed by
humans, we call this automation.
There is, however, a fixed cost to formalizing knowledge. Let that cost be . Generally,
the cost of communicating formalized knowledge, designated by subscript “f” is as follows:
Assumption 2. Costs of communicating formalized knowledge. The total cost of
communicating the knowledge of technology T to L students after that knowledge is
formalized is
.
Here the average cost per student decreases in L, at least initially. If is large, then the
variable portion of the cost might be trivial by comparison. The marginal cost of transmission for
formalized knowledge is less than it is for unformalized knowledge, however, it is not
necessarily zero, as is often assumed.8
Note that this perhaps ignores the greater difficulty of communicating more abstract
knowledge compared to simple information. That is, with an algorithm, for instance, the ability
of the student to understand depends more on the student’s previous knowledge and experience.
E.g., Newton’s laws are not much help to recreate astronomical coordinates without knowledge
of calculus. Of course, in reality, technical knowledge is never pure information, but always
7. With codification, the knowledge is stored in physical form. With automation, a device performs actions
autonomously based on stored knowledge.
8. In some cases, formalization might affect unit costs. For example, a typographer using a dictionary might
take extra time to look up words. To keep things simple, I assume that if formalization increases unit costs, then this
increase is included in the marginal communication cost.
14relies on the user’s previous experience and knowledge to be interpreted and translated into
productive activity.
More generally, I have presented the distinction between formalized and unformalized
knowledge in a highly stylized way. In a more realistic model, there would be degrees of
formalization with a schedule of different fixed costs and different information measures.
Nevertheless, this simple model helps identify some simple relationships between formalization
and other economic variables. Also, while I assume that inventors choose to formalize based on
relative costs, exogenous scientific developments can alter these costs.
Also, note that formalization not only affects the marginal cost of communicating
technical knowledge; it might also affect the qualitative nature of that communication.
Unformalized knowledge requires personal instruction and hands-on experience. The marginal
cost of communicating formalized knowledge is less, but this communication might also permit
less personal interchange, especially to the extent that abstraction and physical embodiment are
involved. For example, more formalized knowledge might be communicated through trade
journals, textbooks or scientific literature.
Appropriability
Finally, communication costs affect appropriability conditions in two ways. First, imitation
costs must be at least as large as communication costs. That is, the cost
of undesired communication cannot be less than the cost of intended communication.
Knowledge holders can increase the cost of unintended communication, for example, by taking
measures to keep the knowledge secret. Survey evidence suggests that these costs can be
substantial (Mansfield et al. 1981, Levin et al. 1987). For this reason, high communication costs
imply a high degree of excludability.
To capture this notion in a simple way, I assume that imitation costs are
Comparing this to Assumptions 1 and 2 above, the first term represents the variable
component of communication costs. This equals communication costs for unformalized
15knowledge; for formalized knowledge it equals communication costs less . Described in this
way, imitation costs are typically much less for formalized knowledge than for unformalized
knowledge. Consequently, free-riding might be more of a problem for formalized knowledge,
while unformalized knowledge might have significant excludability.
Second, the ability of patents to perform as efficient property rights also varies with
formalization. This is because formalized knowledge is easier to describe and this characteristic
is important for the clear delineation of the boundaries of property rights. Efficient operation of a
patent rights system (or any property rights system) depends on predictable boundaries (Bessen
and Meurer 2008). Unpredictability raises dispute risk and transaction costs. Indeed, several
patent law doctrines (definiteness, enablement and written description requirements) can be
interpreted as requirements that the patented knowledge is sufficiently formalized. And patent
offices sometimes struggle to understand early stage technologies where the knowledge is often
not highly formalized and therefore difficult for patent examiners to learn. All this suggests that
transaction costs and dispute risks might be greater for unformalized knowledge.
III. Basic Model
The model is a generalization of Arrow’s (1962) model of a cost-reducing innovation that
is a perfect substitute for an existing technology. I assume that a worker can produce a single unit
of output with the existing technology. Given total output, X, let price, p, be determined by p(X),
the continuous, twice differentiable inverse demand function, with
elasticity . To simplify the proofs, I assume that this elasticity is
constant.
Suppose that there are N firms producing with the old technology and that there are M
prospective inventors who can develop versions of the new technology. Only these M inventors
have the accumulated knowledge and experience with the new technology to possibly bring it
into production. If the ith prospective inventor invests R in R&D, that inventor can produce
output with a version of the new technology that has quality or efficiency qi> 0. I assume that the
outcome of R&D is uncertain. In particular, the quality of technology, qi, is determined as a
16random draw from continuous, differentiable cumulative distribution function F(q), with lower
support zero and unbounded upper support. This distribution is common knowledge.
This technology quality represents the number of units of output that a single worker can
produce so that output is with trained labor Li. If qi > 1, the new technology requires
less labor to produce a unit of output than the old technology and is thus cost-reducing. A more
general model might allow the new technology to be differentiated from the old and, in general,
product differentiation would soften competition. I wish to focus on a situation where the output
of the new technology is a perfect substitute for the old output in order to highlight the effects of
communication costs on softening competition.
I initially assume that inventors do not patent. Then the ith inventor’s knowledge of her
new technology can be transferred to others as follows:
1. Inventors can choose to exchange knowledge of their technologies with each other.
Since the inventors already have deep knowledge of the technology by virtue of their
investments, it should cost little for them to communicate the differences between their
technologies to each other. I assume, without significant loss of generality, that
knowledge exchange among inventors is costless. I initially assume that inventors
efficiently exchange knowledge, coordinating on the most efficient technology with
quality . This allows for innovative complementarity, that is, by
combining knowledge, inventors can derive a technique that is superior to any of their
individual techniques.
2. The ith inventor trains Li workers at a cost of cu(Li) or cf(Li), depending on whether the
inventor chooses to formalize the knowledge or not. I assume that this knowledge is
firm-specific, so that it is paid for by the employers and all workers, both in the old and
new sector, receive wage w. It can be shown that the model generates the same results
with general human capital (details available from author).
3. Third parties can copy the technology and train L workers at an imitation cost of C(L). I
will initially assume that imitation costs are so high that imitators never enter.
17Below I will relax these initial assumptions and consider the role of patents, imitation, and
knowledge transactions explicitly. Actions of the inventors and firms can be captured in a game
with the following stages:
1. Each inventor chooses whether to spend R.
2. If the ith inventor invests, she draws technology with quality qi, and these values are
common knowledge.
3. Inventors can exchange technical knowledge by freely exchanging it or under licensing
agreements. I initially assume that this exchange is costless and efficient, coordinating
on the best available technology with quality q.
4. Each inventor chooses the number of workers to train and trains them. Imitators choose
whether to enter and train workers also.
5. With output capacities determined by the numbers of trained workers, the firms,
including the firms using the old technology, produce, set prices and sell.
I focus on groupwise symmetric Nash equilibria (symmetric among the N old firms and
among the M new firms). Note that because I have modeled only a single period, there is no
opportunity for strategic behavior around formalizing knowledge; the decision to formalize
depends only on the least cost method of training the current workforce. Clearly a richer model




For simplicity, I discuss results for the case where there are only two inventors, M = 2. The
results can readily be expanded to the general case, but exposition is simpler with only two. I
will index the two new technology firms as i = 1,2, and the old technology firms as i = 3,...,N+2
and, for ease of exposition, I treat L as a continuous variable. I look for subgame perfect Nash
equilibria that are groupwise symmetric, solving by backward induction. In the last stage, prices
18are set given the numbers of workers trained in stage 4. If both new technology firms invest at
stage 1, they simultaneously choose the number of workers to train in stage 4.
Consider the game when both new technology firms invest at the first stage. Then total




From this, assuming a group-wise symmetric equilibrium, the first order conditions for an
interior solution are
(2a) (2b)
where s is the share of output produced by each new technology firm, L* is the labor trained by
each new technology firm and j is chosen as the least cost form of training.
First, consider the formalization decision as the number of workers per firm grows larger.
Clearly, at very small values of Li, unformalized knowledge will cost less because
but . However, the marginal cost of unformalized training is always larger, so as
Li increases, at some point, Lf, formalized training will cost less. Furthermore, L* increases with
q, at least as long as N is sufficiently large (see Appendix). This means that a unique value of
q corresponds to Lf. Call this value qf. Then
Proposition 1. Formalization. As long as the optimal number of workers, L*, for the
new technology firms is small, specifically, as long as L*< Lf, firms will not
formalize knowledge. Similarly, if N is sufficiently large and q < qf, then new
technology firms will not formalize knowledge.
In simpler words, it does not pay to formalize unless the upfront cost of formalizing can be
amortized over a sufficiently large number of workers. This is shown in Figure 1, which displays
how training costs might vary with technology quality, q. The cost of unformalized training
19begins increasing from zero at the point where new technology firms can first profitably enter
(discussed below). The cost of formalized training begins at a higher level, thanks to the fixed
upfront cost, but then increases more slowly and is eventually overtaken at qf.
Note that the competitiveness of the old technology market, as represented by the number
of firms, N, can affect the formalization decision of the new technology firms. When a
competitive market in the old technology coexists with the new technology, small changes in
L* do not affect the market price. Then increases in technology quality, q, increase L*. However,
when there are only a few old technology firms, changes in q might decrease L*, depending on
the elasticity of demand.
Coexistence
The nature of the equilibrium solutions depend on various parameters, most significantly
technology quality, q. Different parameter values define different solution regions. I derive the
threshold conditions for each region in the Appendix and just highlight the regions here.
First, unless the technology quality is sufficiently large, specifically unless q > qe, where
qe < 1, new technology firms will not find it profitable to enter.
Second, if technology quality is even larger, specifically if q > qd, where qd > 1,
innovation will be “drastic,” that is, the old technology firms will drop out of the market because
the new technology firms charge a price that is less than the unit cost of the old technology. This
happens when the duopoly price is less than the wage, w. This region corresponds to Arrow’s
(1962) drastic innovation, except here it is for a duopoly instead of a monopoly.
The various regions from these two thresholds are also shown in Figure 1. Below qe, new
technology firms do not enter. As q increases above qe but remains below qd, the new technology
firms enter and coexist with the old technology firms. At even better levels of technology
quality, the old technology firms drop out. Note that these regions imply that formalization is
loosely correlated with drastic innovation. At low levels of q, knowledge is unformalized and the
technologies coexist; at sufficiently high levels of q, knowledge is formalized and innovation is
drastic. In between there is a mixed area, but the existence of these two combinations is quite
general, as we shall see below.
20In some cases, there might also be a region where the new technology firms set a limit
price. That is, the duopoly price might be larger than w, but the new technology firms
nevertheless make out better by charging a price of w (or slightly less), driving the old
technology firms out of the market. This limit price region occurs when q > ql, where ql > 1.
Arrow (1962) called this behavior “nondrastic innovation,” but in the context here it might be
more accurately described as a limit priced region.
Putting these regions together, we get
Proposition 2. Coexistence. With N firms possessing the old technology and 2 firms
possessing the new technology of quality q,
a. If , where , then a unique groupwise
symmetric “coexistence” equilibrium exists where the old and new technologies are
both used.
b. Firms will not formalize knowledge in some portion of this region. For N
sufficiently large, old and new technologies will coexist and knowledge will by
unformalized in the region .
c. For qu < q, the old technology will no longer by used.
Thus, in general, a region will exist where old and new technologies coexist and where
knowledge is unformalized. Note that new technology firms will enter even when the new
technology is inferior to the old, in contrast to the common assumption that new, inferior
technologies only appear when they address a differentiated market (e.g., Christensen 1997).
Here, even without product differentiation, new technology firms can enter because the old
technology firms charge an oligopoly price that exceeds cost. When the number of old
technology firms grows sufficiently large, this possibility vanishes in the limit.
The generality of coexistence depends on the presence of positive communication costs.
Specifically,
Proposition 3. If communication costs, c, are zero, then , so that
the range of the coexistence equilibrium vanishes as N grows large.
21The proof is in the Appendix, but this result follows from two simple intuitions. First, as
just noted, as N grows large, new technology firms cannot enter until the new technology is at
least as efficient as the old. Second, without communication costs, new technology firms can
limit price as long as the new technology is more efficient than the old. On the other hand, when
communication costs are positive and knowledge is not formalized, these costs act as a capacity
constraint. If the capacity constraint binds sufficiently, then the new technology firms cannot
limit price until their technology reaches quality ql. That is, for less efficient technologies, they
cannot scale up sufficiently to make limit pricing a profitable strategy.
Thus because communication costs constrain capacity, they generate a non-null
coexistence region even when the old technology market is highly competitive. Of course, in
practice, other sorts of capacity constraints such as a limited supply of critical skilled labor
sometimes play a similar role. Nevertheless, communication costs with unformalized knowledge
are significant because they likely provide a rather general constraint on capacity for marginally
advantageous new technologies, such as for early stage technologies.
The general existence of a coexistence equilibrium is important because it changes the
nature of competition between firms using the new technology, including innovation incentives.
To show this, I will focus here and in the remainder of the paper on the case where the number of
old technology firms is large. There are, of course, important cases where the market for the old
technology is not so competitive, however, it is difficult to obtain general analytical results for
those cases.
From Proposition 2b there will generally be a coexistence equilibrium with unformalized
knowledge. I contrast this competitive/unformalized equilibrium with a drastic equilibrium (q >
qd) with formalized knowledge, assuming that the market is sufficiently large to support
formalization. Moreover, to keep things simple, I assume that for this drastic equilibrium the
marginal cost of communication is so small that it can be ignored. This drastic/formalized case
thus corresponds to the conditions often imposed in the literature. Clearly, not all industries and
technologies fall into one of these two cases, however, as I discuss below, evidence suggests that
22they are both common enough and this stylized treatment highlights important differences in
behavior.
Old technology market and strategic interaction
In particular, new technology firms interact very differently in these two equilibria.
Consider, for example, how each firm’s technology influences the willingness of the other firm
to exchange technology. Suppose, for the moment, that firms do not exchange knowledge in
stage 3. Let represent the equilibrium profit of the ith firm at stage 2, before
knowledge exchange.
Proposition 4. Strategic Interaction.
a. For the drastic equilibrium with zero marginal communication costs,
and .
b. For the coexistence equilibrium with unformalized knowledge,
but .
The proof is in the Appendix. As I develop below, this difference in behavior is at the root
of differences in regard to the effect of patents and the free exchange of knowledge. In both
equilibria, each new technology firm benefits from improvements to its own technology.
However, each firm suffers from improvements to its rival’s technology in the drastic
equilibrium, but not in the competitive coexistence equilibrium. The drastic case corresponds to
the standard intuition. Improvements to the rival technology increase the rival’s market share
and decrease the price in the drastic equilibrium. The rival becomes a tougher competitor with
better technology.
However, in the competitive coexistence equilibrium, an improvement to the rival’s
technology will spur the rival to increase its market share, but, thanks to the competition from the
old technology firms, the market price will not change. This means that each new technology
23firm will be unaffected by improvements to its rival’s technology. The rival’s increase in market
share comes only at the expense of the old technology firms.
Thus three-way competition changes the nature of competition between new technology
firms. Note that this result depends on a competitive market for the old technology. It might not
obtain if, say, the market for the old technology were a monopoly. In that case, the market price
would change, in general, affecting all firms. Thus this result puts a new twist on the
Schumpeterian argument about the relative importance of competition and monopoly for
innovation. Here, even when the incumbents do not innovate, technology competition differs
depending on whether the incumbent market is a monopoly or is competitive.
Innovation incentives
An inventor will choose to invest in stage 1 if the expected profits exceed the cost of
innovation, R. The nature of the rents also differs between the coexistence/unformalized
equilibrium and the drastic/formalized equilibrium. Substituting (2a) back into (1a), for interior
solutions, the optimal rents equal
(3)
where γ is the elasticity of the average teaching cost per student. The first term represents a
markup over cost, wL + c. The second term can be interpreted as oligopsony rents earned on
human capital. For the drastic/formalized equilibrium, γ equals zero, so the entire rent derives
from the markup over cost, as in standard models. For the coexistence/unformalized equilibrium,
on the other hand, profits come largely from rents on human capital. This is because s will
generally be small in this region—market share, s, equals zero when q equals qe, and it increases
as q grows within this region. When market share is zero, the first term drops out.
The stage 1 investment decision with these rents can be compared to the social planner’s
second-best decision on whether to invest. It will be socially desirable to invest in stage 1 when
the net change in social welfare exceeds innovation cost R. Consider the situation where the
24number of old technology firms, N, is asymptotically large. Then the pre-innovation price will
equal the cost, w.
In the case of a drastic innovation, the new duopoly price will be less than w and the social
planner will want to charge a lower price. As in the standard analysis, the net change in social
welfare will consist of additional consumer surplus from the drop in price, duopoly profits of the
new technology firms and a deadweight loss. In general, the profit of each firm will be less than
the net social welfare and therefore the innovation incentive will be less than socially optimal.
There will be some socially desirable innovations that are not profitable enough for inventors to
invest.
On the other hand, when the innovation falls into the coexistence/unformalized range, the
market price remains unchanged and the net social welfare is the cost savings realized by the
new technology firms,
leading to first order maximizing condition . This is the same as first order
condition (2a) when market share, s, is zero. Thus
Proposition 5. When knowledge exchange is Pareto efficient, when the number of
old technology firms, N, is asymptotically large and when the market share of a new
technology firm, s, is asymptotically small, private rents equal net social welfare in
the coexistence equilibrium, generating socially optimal levels of investment in
innovation.
In effect, private innovation incentives in the coexistence/unformalized equilibrium will
be approximately socially optimal when the old technology market is competitive. The intuition
behind this result is that rents do not dissipate to consumers in this setting and there is no
deadweight loss because the market price remains unchanged. I have derived this result under the
assumptions that knowledge exchange is Pareto efficient and that imitation costs are high; below
I show that this result can hold even when these two assumptions are relaxed.
25For a similar reason, patents do not significantly increase innovation incentives in the
coexistence/unformalized equilibrium. The usual argument is that innovation incentives are
larger in a monopoly than a duopoly because more rents dissipate to consumers in duopoly.
Consider the effect of a broad patent that gives one new technology firm the power to exclude
the other from the market. Assume that: 1.) each firm has a fifty percent chance of winning the
patent ex ante (stage 1) as long as they both invest R, and 2.) that the patent holder and the other
firm can agree to a patent license that earns joint profits equal to the monopoly rent. For the
moment, I maintain the assumption that Pareto efficient knowledge exchange occurs in stage 3,
allowing both firms to coordinate on the best technology with or without patents. In the drastic/
formalized equilibrium, a straightforward calculation shows that the monopoly profit exceeds
twice the duopoly rents. That is, the joint profit is greater with a broad patent. Since each firm
has a a 50:50 change of winning the patent ex ante, its expected rents are half the monopoly rent,
which is larger than the duopoly rent. Based on this reasoning, a broad patent will provide
greater ex ante incentive to invest in innovation.
However, when the new technology is introduced into a competitive market, a firm with a
broad patent on the new technology can exclude the other new technology firm, but not the old
technology firms.9 From Proposition 4, above, one firm’s profit is unaffected by the other’s
technology in a competitive coexistence equilibrium. In this case, a patent does not increase joint
profits. Even if the patentee hired the other inventor to train workers, the combined profits would
not exceed twice the duopoly profit. Hence,
Proposition 6. Patents and incentives. Assuming efficient knowledge exchange, a
broad patent increases ex ante innovation incentives in the drastic/formalized
equilibrium, but not in the coexistence/unformalized equilibrium.
Of course, I have assumed high imitation costs, C, so that free-riding is not an issue.
However, this result holds even if this assumption is weakened, as long as the imitation cost still
exceeds the cost of intentional learning for unformalized knowledge, . This is
9. In general, the old technology would normally count as prior art so that a patent on the
new technology could not read against the old.
26because for small values of q, an imitator cannot profitably enter. Specifically, let qi be the value
of q that solves . At this value, an imitator makes zero profits; at smaller values, an
imitator would make negative profits and so does not enter. Then the range of the coexistence/
formalized equilibrium can simply be redefined as . In other words,
even with imitation, a coexistence/formalized equilibrium still exists as long as imitation costs
are positive. In this region, Propositions 5 and 6 hold. The effect of imitation is to possibly
reduce the range of this equilibrium, but not to change behavior within the region. The actual
extent of the coexistence region is, of course, an empirical matter. Free-riding remains a problem
outside of this region, especially because imitation costs might be particularly low when
knowledge is formalized.
These results also depend on the strong assumption that knowledge exchange is Pareto
efficient. I relax this assumption in the next section.
Inefficient bargaining and free exchange
Suppose that by exchanging knowledge inventors can realize a superior technology of
quality q such that . That is, the inventors possess complementary knowledge and
knowledge exchange is socially desirable. Without Pareto efficient exchange, innovation
incentives will be insufficient because firm profits will generally be smaller if the firms do not
have access to the best technology. Thus the assumption of Pareto efficient exchange is
important for Propositions 5 and 6.
From Proposition 4, in the drastic/formalized equilibrium, firms will not necessarily want
to exchange knowledge without compensation because this could reduce their profits. In this
case, there is a knowledge externality. In the standard Coasean analysis, patents permit firms to
transact over knowledge exchange for a license fee. This facilitates Pareto efficient exchange,
“internalizing” the externality, as long as transaction costs are negligible. Thus patents might be
important for increasing the returns to innovation in the drastic/formalized equilibrium not only
by providing greater market power, but also by facilitating coordination on the best technology.
However, this logic does not apply in the coexistence/unformalized equilibrium. From
Proposition 4 for the competitive equilibrium, ,
27so it is privately beneficial to both parties to freely exchange knowledge even if the innovative
complementarity (q - q1) is small. By comparison, for the drastic equilibrium this is generally not
true and firm 1 will find free exchange beneficial only with a large innovative complementarity
if at all. Thus
Proposition 7. Private returns to knowledge exchange. If the technology realized by
exchanging knowledge has quality , then when a large number, N, of old
technology firms compete and knowledge is unformalized, new technology firms
privately benefit from exchanging knowledge even if is small.
This means that Pareto efficient exchange should take place in the coexistence/
unformalized equilibrium (assuming that the old technology market is competitive) even without
patents. With patent licensing, or with technology licensing negotiations more generally,
bargaining might fail in the presence of transaction costs or asymmetric information. When this
occurs in a competitive coexistence equilibrium, firms will still find it profitable to freely
exchange information. Thus Propositions 5 and 6 should hold generally for the coexistence/
unformalized equilibrium, with or without patents and with or without transaction costs.
Note that I am specifically discussing mutual exchange as opposed to unilateral sharing of
knowledge. I assume that during exchange, each party can detect whether the other party is
sharing knowledge and terminate the exchange if the other party fails to share. At worst, only
partial knowledge will have been exchanged and incomplete knowledge might well be useless.
Of course, if mutual exchange is beneficial in a repeated game, then inventors might be willing
to unilaterally share knowledge, expecting reciprocal sharing in the future.
Nevertheless, this result goes against the conventional wisdom that free exchange of
knowledge between inventors is surprising. That wisdom appears to depend on an assumption
that a firm is harmed by improvements to a competitor’s technology, but, as Proposition 4 shows,
that assumption does not apply in all conditions. Free knowledge exchange occurs even when
patents are available but when bargaining over a patent license (or sale) fails. This means that
such bargaining failure does not necessarily reduce innovation incentives. Under these specific
conditions of a competitive coexistence equilibrium with unformalized knowledge, there is no
28“anti-commons” (Heller and Eisenberg). As I discuss below, these conditions seem to apply to
some early stage technologies, but not to all technologies. Much of the evidence advanced
regarding anti-commons (e.g., Murray and Stern 2007, Williams 2010) relates to biotechnology,
which might well be different.10 Moreover, even where free knowledge exchange does take
place, it is not clear that the effect of patents on early stage technologies is always benign. As I
noted above, patent boundaries might be much less predictable when knowledge of the
technology is highly unformalized. This could give rise to disputes that reduce innovation
incentives (Bessen 2009, Bessen and Meurer 2008).
Thus patents play a very different role in a competitive coexistence equilibrium than in the
drastic equilibrium and in much of the patent literature. In the competitive coexistence
equilibrium with unformalized knowledge, patents do nothing to increase innovation incentives
and optimal incentives are realized without patents. When patents are available in markets with
these characteristics, bargaining failure might not be a problem, but unpredictable patent
boundaries might be.
Finally, I have discussed knowledge exchange as a communication from one inventor to
another, one firm to another. However, historically much knowledge has been exchanged by
employees moving from one firm to another (Epstein 1998, Hilaire-Perez and Verna 2006,
Jeremy 1981). Trade secrecy laws, laws providing strong enforcement of employee non-compete
agreements, and other laws can prevent the free exchange of knowledge. Transactions can still
take place—for example, an employee bound by a strong non-compete agreement could pay to
be released from the employment contract (or their prospective new employer could). But to the
extent that asymmetric information, transaction costs, etc. limit such transactions, knowledge
exchange could be curtailed.
10. Perhaps for these innovations the old technology markets (often small-molecule
pharmaceuticals) are not highly competitive or the innovations are drastic.
29Other means of appropriation
Firms can often take private action to appropriate greater returns from innovation. Even
without patents, new technology firms can merge, subject, perhaps, to antitrust regulations.
Firms can also form patent pools or they can buy out others’ patents—that is, they can build
patent thickets—to create de facto broad patent coverage with greater market power.
However, technological maturity might affect the benefits of taking such actions. Because
communication costs constrain the market for the new technology in the coexistence equilibrium,
monopoly control of the new technology might not deliver any greater market power then,
following from Proposition 4. On the other hand, if merging does not incur large transaction
costs, then this might be advantageous in a drastic equilibrium. Similarly, in the drastic
equilibrium, a firm can also benefit from buying its competitors’ patents or amassing market
power through a large number of overlapping patents generally. A firm establishing a dominant
patent position in this way is said to build a patent “thicket.” But note that the motivation to do
so only exists during the drastic equilibrium when output is not constrained by communication
costs. To the extent that the drastic equilibrium is associated with mature technologies, firms’
propensity to patent should be larger with mature technologies, all else equal.
This might help explain the persistent relationship between early stage innovation and
small entrepreneurs. While entrepreneurs without critical complementary assets might need
patents or other strong appropriability to profit with mature technologies (Teece 1986),
entrepreneurs lacking those assets, and perhaps even lacking patents, are not at a particular
disadvantage during the early phase of a technology. However, to the extent that firms practicing
the old technology have patents that read on the new technology, patents can serve to block entry
to some degree (see Cockburn and MacGarvie 2010).
Patent pools can serve a similar function to patent thickets if pooling serves to increase the
joint market power of participants. But patent pools can also serve as a means to exchange
knowledge, much like a licensing agreement (see Meyer 2003 on the Bessemer pool). While a
licensing agreement facilitates exchange between two parties, a patent pool can facilitate
exchange between multiple parties with complementary technologies. Many patent pools have,
30in fact, formed early in the life of a technology when rivals had blocking patents on
complementary technologies (e.g., the sewing machine pool, see Lampe and Moser 2009).
V. Empirical Relevance
A variety of casual evidence suggests the importance of formalization. Industry and
technical trade publications, conferences and meetings regularly feature exchange of newly
codified knowledge gleaned from working with new technologies and this has been a feature of
industrial life at least since the nineteenth century (Nuvolari 2004, Mokyr 2002). Standardization
of new products and processes is regularly part of the commercialization process, formal industry
standards bodies play a critical role in many technologies such as the Internet, and many firms
pursue “platform strategies” attempting to develop de facto standards. Much innovative activity
is directed to embodying technical knowledge in hardware or software to automate it. For
example, much information technology has embodied routine knowledge (Autor et al. 2003).
Also, the model implies that the maturity of a technology should affect communication
costs and that these should in turn affect other industry characteristics under certain conditions.
That is, the model predicts that behavior will change as a technology matures when new
technology does not at first completely replace an older technology that is competitively
supplied. These conditions apply in many industries where innovation is highly incremental such
as in information technology. These conditions might not apply everywhere. For instance, in
biotechnology innovations are sometimes drastic, such as methods using recombinant DNA to
produce erythropoietin.
Nevertheless a variety of evidence suggests that behavior in many industries changes with
technological maturity in ways that are consistent with the model. Although these phenomena
might have other explanations, the apparent importance of technological maturity as an
explanatory variable suggests the empirical relevance of this analysis:
1. The nature of training and technology diffusion changes as technologies mature.
Historians describe how the early mechanics of the Industrial Revolution typically learned
their skills and knowledge through close personal exchange (Meyer 2006, Wallace 1978,
31Thomson 2009, Rosenberg 1970). Social networks were important and the relationships between
teachers and students were sometimes supplemented with family relationships. Because of the
importance of personal interchange, inventive activity was highly concentrated in a small
number of regions. And the international diffusion of technology depended heavily on the
migration of mechanics knowledgeable of the newest techniques (Jeremy 1981). By the end of
the nineteenth century, both the products and the training of workers were much more
standardized and new technology spread rapidly over the globe.
Some evidence suggests that this pattern might apply today as well. Teece (1977)
documents that the cost of transferring mechanical technologies overseas by multinational firms
decreases substantially with the age of the technology.11 Vernon (1966) cites evidence that firms
do not export a technology until it has matured and is relatively standardized. Moser (2009) finds
that the formalization in chemical technology associated with the periodic table decreased the
localization of the chemical industry. Using patent citations as a proxy for knowledge spillovers,
Jaffe et al. (1993) find that the localization of knowledge decreases with the age of a technology.
Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2009) find that older manufacturing technologies are less localized.
Thus more mature technologies often seem to have lower communication costs and seem to
diffuse more widely.
Conversely, developing nations that have realized economic growth thanks to the export of
mature technologies from advanced nations sometimes find it difficult to master policies that
foster the early stage innovation needed to move to the innovation frontier. Development
economists (Gill and Kharas 2007, 2009) have identified a common pattern of a “middle income
trap” that could be explained by differences in knowledge acquisition.
Other aspects of human capital acquisition seem to change with technological maturity as
well. Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) find that the demand for educated workers declines with the
age of the technology employed. This makes sense if schooling complements the ability of
workers to learn unformalized knowledge.
11. For chemical and petroleum refining plants, he finds that the age relationship is weaker, but the cost
decreases with the novelty of the technology.
322. Startups rely on hard-to-transfer knowledge
Darby, Zucker and several co-authors have studied the relationship between “star”
scientists in biotechnology and the development of successful startup businesses based on new
biotechnology. They find that active involvement by the star scientists (who work mainly at
universities) is critical to commercial success.12 More generally, other studies show that
participation of university scientists is essential for successful commercial licensing of their
discoveries and this participation increases university royalties.13 All of this suggests that
critical knowledge is not highly fungible with these early phase technologies.
For similar reasons, some researchers have argued that the startups of Silicon Valley
benefit from high employee mobility encouraged by California’s lax enforcement of employee
non-compete agreements (Gilson 1999, Hyde 2003).
3. Entry by new firms does not eliminate rents during the early phase.
Studying one of the first major new industrial technologies in the US, Zevin (1971) found
that profits persisted for nearly three decades in the textile industry despite high levels of firm
entry and widely available equipment. He attributes this to the limited supply of individuals who
had the skills and knowledge to build, install, operate, manage and maintain the new technology.
This pattern seems more general. In received theory, firm entry dissipates rents and
thereby reduces innovation incentives. However, Gort and Klepper (1982) find the opposite in a
study of 46 product life cycles: innovation rates were greatest during the early phases of the
technology when firm entry was greatest, consistent with the model.
12. Successful entrants are located near the star scientists, active participation by the scientists is positively
associated with a variety of firm performance measurements, close ties to scientists shortens the time to IPO and
increases the IPO proceeds. See Darby and Zucker (2001), Darby et al. (2001), Zucker et al. (1998, 2001), Cockburn
and Henderson (1998).
13. Jensen and Thursby (2001), Colyvas et al. (2002), Agrawal (2006), Agrawal and Henderson (2002),
Lach and Schankerman (2003).
334. Patent propensity is greater during the mature phase.
The model suggests that the practice of building large portfolios of patents makes more
sense for mature technologies. Gort and Klepper (1982) found that patenting rates were much
higher during the “shakeout” phase of an industry than during the earlier phases, despite the
higher innovation rates during the early phases (see Bessen and Meurer 2008, pp. 90-1 for a
comparison chart).
Relatedly, Suárez and Utterback (1995) show that industry consolidation tends to follow
the formalization inherent in a “dominant design.”
5. Free mutual exchange of technical knowledge sometimes occurs during the early phase.
The early mechanics of the Industrial Revolution often shared designs (Meyer 2006). Even
when mechanic/inventors such as Oliver Evans obtained patents, they would often not enforce
them against other mechanics in their networks (Wallace 1978). MacLeod and Nuvolari (2009)
review some of the historical literature and find many instances where nineteenth century
inventors freely exchanged technical knowledge, including cases in important industries such as
iron and steelmaking (Allen 1983, Meyer 2003), and steam engines (Nuvolari 2004). In some
cases, the knowledge was only shared within a well-defined group, such as within the Bessemer
patent pool; in other cases, knowledge was shared more widely, for example, through public
trade journals, although even in these cases, only a limited audience would have had the
experience and knowledge to understand and make use of the knowledge (Mokyr 2002). In many
cases it is also evident that the inventors benefited by way of human capital, for example, in the
Cleveland blast furnaces, the Cornish steam engines and the Bessemer steel pool, the inventors
all worked as engineers.
Various scholars have also documented important modern instances of free knowledge
exchange. Von Hippel (1987) finds knowledge exchange between steel mini-mills and user
innovators in many fields (see also Schrader 1991), Meyer (2003) documents free exchange in
the early personal computer industry and Cockburn and Henderson (1994) document information
sharing in the early phases of the technology of blood pressure medications (but not in the late
phase where innovations are potentially drastic). Much has also been written about free exchange
34of Open Source Software, which includes much key software of the Internet (see Bitzer and
Schröder 2006). Where innovations are obviously tied to human capital, as with medical and
surgical techniques, free exchange is seen as normal professional behavior. For example,
attempts to patent surgical procedures were met with strong and quick opposition from the
medical professional organizations.14
In some cases, the free exchange ends when the technology enters a different phase
allowing drastic innovation. In other cases, competition remains “soft,” sometimes because
human capital constraints are supplemented by other market factors that limit the possibilities for
drastic innovations. Nevertheless, the evidence is broadly consistent with the notion that mutual
exchange of technical knowledge is common especially when the costs of communication and
uncertainty over value limit the intensity of market competition.
VI. Conclusion
The simple notion that private parties can make investments that reduce the cost of
communicating technical knowledge has a rich set of implications for economic behavior: it
affects the nature of competition and human capital acquisition, the role of small firms, the use of
patents and the free exchange of knowledge.
More generally, this analysis suggests that technological maturity might have importance
for a variety of fields of study. For example, some scholars posit that technical knowledge
defines the boundaries of the firm because some knowledge can be exchanged better within firms
(e.g., Kogut and Zander 1992). Yet the returns to technical knowledge and the nature of
knowledge exchange—and the effectiveness of extra-firm exchange, including licensing
markets—changes with technological maturity, affecting mergers, make-or-buy decisions, the
significance of entrepreneurs and more. Formalization might also affect the degree of
decentralization within a firm.
14. The response brought a change in the patent statute exempting these procedures from patent
enforcement.
35Also, communication costs might help explain the apparent paradox that innovation with
new technologies often appears to be highly localized despite dramatic improvements in
telecommunications technology and the globalization of production. Close personal
communication appears to be particularly important for unformalized early technologies,
possibly explaining this pattern.
Similarly, the corresponding implication for economic growth is that it might be important
to foster growth in both early and late phase industries. Nations that can foster the development
of new technologies in both phases might be at a significant competitive advantage to nations
that are specialized in mature technologies.
Moreover, this analysis of communication costs poses a challenge for innovation policy.
Most of the economic theory of innovation has assumed negligible communication cost and
therefore it really only applies to mature technologies. This theory provides little practical policy
guidance for early stage innovation. The patent system has the difficult task of handling not only
very different types of technologies, but technologies at different stages of maturity all within a
unified legal framework. Intuitions about patents that are true for mature technologies, might be
detrimental for early technologies. For instance, some judges and legal scholars have argued that
early stage technologies should have broad patent scope (Kitch 1977, Kieff 2001). But the
analysis here suggests that this approach is ill-founded. More generally, other areas of policy
such as trade secrecy law and the law regulating employee non-compete agreements might be
arguably more important than patents for early stage technologies. A specific focus on policy for
early stage technologies is important because without adequate incentives early on, the profitable
mature stages might never be reached or perhaps reached only after a long delay.
Appendix
Proposition 1
The cost of unformalized training will equal the cost of formalized training when L = Lf, which
solves . It is straightforward to show that this solves to a
unique positive value. Also, taking the derivatives, for positive values of L. This
means that when L exceeds Lf, formalized training will cost less and not otherwise. Thus
36inventors formalize knowledge when L > Lf and not otherwise.
To complete the proof I will next show that the optimal value of L increase with q when N is
asymptotically large. First, taking the limit of (2b) as N becomes infinite, p = w. This means that
total output is X0 such that . Each inventor’s share of output is then .
Also, plugging the price of w into (2a) and solving for s, yields
(A1)





The first inequality because p > w, the second because and ε < 1. Because of (A3), L* will
increase with q until it reaches qf which for which the equilibrium value of L equals Lf. Below
this value knowledge will by unformalized, above it, formalized.
Propositions 2 and 3
First, consider the entry threshold for new technology firms. They can profitably enter when the
equilibrium price exceeds their unit cost.15 Since c(0) = 0, c(L) is approximately zero for small
L. Then the minimum unit cost for a new technology firm will simply be w/q. From (2b), entry at
some scale will be feasible when
(A4) or .
Next, consider the condition for drastic innovation where the equilibrium price with N=0 is less
than or equal to w. Setting the price equal to w in (2a) and rearranging, let
(A5) .
Also, by taking the implicit derivative of (2a) with N=0,
(A6) .
This means that once the price falls below w, additional increases in q will increase total output
(= 2 q L*), driving the price even lower. From this it follows that the drastic equilibrium will
15. I maintain the assumption of efficient exchange of knowledge for simplicity. In a more
realistic model, a firm might not share its knowledge under some conditions if that might keep
the other firm from entering.
37hold in the region where
q > qd.
Limit pricing will be feasible when the new technology firms can profitably supply the entire
market at a price of w. For a given q, the new technology firms will need Ll workers each to
supply the market where . It will be profitable for them to do so when
(A4) or .
Note by inspection that . This shows parts (a) and (c) of Proposition 2. Part (b)
follows directly from this and Proposition 1.
Finally, note from (A4) that . Also, ql= 1 if c = 0. Proposition 3 follows from this.
Proposition 4
The first order maximizing conditions with no knowledge exchange are
(A5) .
First, consider the drastic case, where N = c' = 0. Then these can be solved for equilibrium
values
(A6) and .
We seek to explore the variation of firm profits with the technology qualities of the two firms.
Expressing profits of firm 1 as
(A7) ,
we seek to investigate the sign of
(A8)
where i,j = 1,2. I will show the calculation for i=2, j=1 and the reader can repeat the method for
the other cases. Note first that by the envelope theorem, the second term is zero. Also the first
term is zero. Then, using (A6),
(A9) .
The second part of the proposition concerns the case with positive communication costs
(unformalized), but where N grows asymptotically large. The analog to (A6) is
(A10) and .
38For the case where i=2 and j=1, the first two terms in (A8) drop out as before, but now
because x2 has no influence on the equilibrium price, thus
(A11) .
The other combinations follow in a similar manner.
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